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ABSTRACT
The fact that a coalition has a strategy does not mean that the
coalition knows what the strategy is. If the coalition knows the
strategy, then such a strategy is called a know-how strategy of
the coalition. The paper proposes the notion of a second-order
know-how strategy for the case when one coalition knows what
the strategy of another coalition is. The main technical result is a
sound and complete logical system describing the interplay between
the distributed knowledge modality and the second-order coalition
know-how modality.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper we study the interplay between coalition strategies
and the distributed knowledge in multiagent systems.
1.1 Coalition Strategies
STOP
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c
Figure 1: State of Trafficw1.
Consider the traffic situation depicted in Figure 1, where a regular
vehicle d and three self-driving vehicles a, b, and c approach an
intersection. There are stop signs at the intersection facing cars
c and d . According to the traffic rules, these two cars must slow
down, stop, and yield to truck b.
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Suppose that the driver of car d does not notice the sign and, as
a result, this car is approaching the intersection with a constant
speed. If neither of the vehicles changes its behavior, car d will hit
the side of the rear half of truck b, at the location marked with a
red zigzag shape on the figure. Truck b can potentially slow down,
but then car d will hit the side of truck b in the front half instead of
the rear half. Thus, to avoid being struck by car d , truck b has to
accelerate and pass the intersection before car d does. We assume
that in this case if car a maintains the same speed, then there will be
a rear-end collision between truck b and car a. Hence, to avoid any
collision, not only must truck b accelerate, but car a must accelerate
as well. In other words, to prevent a collision, vehicles a and b must
engage in a strategic cooperation. We say that coalition {a,b} has
a strategy to prevent a collision.
The traffic situation is further complicated by two buildings,
shown in Figure 1 as grey rectangles. The buildings prevent car
a and truck b from seeing car d . Although coalition {a,b} has a
strategy to avoid collision, it does not know what this strategy is,
nor does it know that such a strategy exists. However, self-driving
car c can observe that car d is not slowing down, and it can make
coalition {a,b} aware of the presence of car d as well as its speed
and location. With the information shared by car c , not only will
coalition {a,b} have a strategy to avoid a collision, but it also will
know what this strategy is.
In general, the following cases might take place: (i) a coalition
does not have a strategy; (ii) a coalition has a strategy, but it does
not know that it has a strategy; (iii) a coalition knows that it has a
strategy, but it does not know what the strategy is; (iv) a coalition
knows that it has a strategy and it knows what this strategy is. In
the last case, we say that the coalition has a know-how strategy.
Know-how strategies were studied before under different names.
While Jamroga and Ågotnes talked about “knowledge to identify
and execute a strategy” [5], Jamroga and van der Hoek discussed
“difference between an agent knowing that he has a suitable strat-
egy and knowing the strategy itself” [6]. Van Benthem called such
strategies “uniform” [16]. Broersen talked about “knowingly do-
ing” [2], while Broersen, Herzig, and Troquard discussed modality
“know they can do” [3].
In our example, coalition {a,b} has a know-how strategy to avoid
a collision after car c shares the traffic informationwith the coalition.
In other words, it is not coalition {a,b} but the single-element
coalition {c} that knows what is the strategy of coalition {a,b}.
We refer to such strategies as second-order know-how strategies by
analogy with the commonly used term second-order knowledge [7].
Second-order know-how manifests itself in many settings. For
example, a teacher might know how a student can succeed or a
group of campaign advisers might know how a political party can
win the elections.
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1.2 Epistemic Transition Systems
We use the notion of an epistemic transition system to formalize the
concept of a second-order know-how strategy. A fragment of an
epistemic transition system corresponding to the traffic situation
described above is depicted on the diagram in Figure 2. In particular,
the traffic situation depicted in Figure 1 is represented by statew1
on this diagram. The arrows on the diagram correspond to possible
transitions of the system.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that transitions of this
system only depend on the actions of agents a and b. Moreover,
each of agents a and b is assumed to have just three strategies: to
slow down (−), to maintain current speed (0), and to accelerate (+).
In Figure 2, transitions are labeled by the strategies of agents a and
b that accomplish the transition.
If a transition is labeled with strategy profile (x ,y), then x repre-
sents the strategy of car a and y represents the strategy of truck b.
Although there are nine possible transitions from statew1, corre-
sponding to nine possible strategy profiles (x ,y), the fragment of
this system (depicted in Figure 2) shows only four such transitions
leading to statesw4,w5,w6, andw7.
Aswe discussed earlier, vehiclesa andb can use coalition strategy
(+,+) to avoid a collision. However, they do not know that this
coalition strategy would prevent a collision because they do not
even know the presence of vehicled , let alone its location and speed.
To show this formally, consider a hypothetical statew2 in Figure 2.
In this state, vehicle d is currently at the spot marked by symbol
X on Figure 1. In this state, car d is closer to the intersection than
it is in state w1. A simultaneous acceleration of vehicles a and b
(coalition strategy (+,+)) would not prevent a collision because
car d would hit the side of truck b in the rear half. Instead, in state
w2, coalition {a,b} can use, for example, strategy (0,−) to avoid
a collision. Under this strategy, car a maintains the current speed
and truck b slows down. Since vehicles a and b cannot see vehicle
d , they cannot distinguish statesw1 andw2. We define a coalition
know-how strategy at statew1 as a strategy that would succeed in
all states indistinguishable from statew1 by the coalition. Thus, the
transition system whose fragment is depicted on Figure 2 does not
have a know-how strategy for coalition {a,b} to avoid a collision in
statew1. Statesw1 andw2 are not the only indistinguishable states
in this system. For example, statew3 in the same figure, where car
d is not present at the scene, is also indistinguishable from states
w1 andw2 to coalition {a,b}.
1.3 Second-Order Know-How Modality
Recall that self-driving car c can observe that car d is not slowing
down. Thus, car c can distinguish statesw1 from statesw2 andw3 of
this system. The system might have other states indistinguishable
to car c from state w1. These states, for example, could differ by
traffic situations on nearby streets. However, in all these states,
coalition {a,b} can use strategy (+,+) to avoid a collision. Hence,
we say that agent c knows how coalition {a,b} can avoid a collision.
We denote this fact byw1 ⊩ H{a,b }{c } (“avoid a collision”). In general,
we writew ⊩ HDC φ if coalitionC has distributed knowledge of how
coalition D can achieve outcome φ from statew . We call modality
H the second-order know-how modality. Although in our example
coalitions D = {a,b} and C = {c} are disjoint, we do allow these
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Figure 2: A fragment of an epistemic transition system.
coalitions to have common elements. Modality HCC expresses the
existence of a know-how strategy of coalition C known to the
coalition itself. Thus, it expresses an existence of a first-order know-
how strategy of coalition C .
Properties of first-order know-how modalities and their inter-
play with different forms of the knowledge modality have been
studied before. Ågotnes and Alechina [1] proposed a complete
axiomatization of an interplay between single-agent knowledge
and first-order coalition know-how modalities to achieve a goal
in one step. A modal logic that combines the distributed knowl-
edge modality with the first-order coalition know-how modality
to maintain a goal was axiomatized by Naumov and Tao [8]. A
sound and complete logical system in a single-agent setting for
know-how strategies to achieve a goal in multiple steps rather than
to maintain a goal is developed by Fervari, Herzig, Li, and Wang [4].
A trimodal logical system that describes an interplay between the
(not know-how) coalition strategic modality, the first-order coali-
tion know-how modality, and the distributed knowledge modality
was developed by Naumov and Tao [10]. They also proposed a
logical system that combines the first-order coalition know-how
modality with the distributed knowledge modality in the perfect
recall setting [9, 12]. Wang proposed a complete axiomatization of
“knowing how” as a binary modality [17, 18], but his logical system
does not include the knowledge modality.
The main goal of this paper is to describe the interplay between
the second-order know-how modality H and the distributed knowl-
edge modality K. In other words, we axiomatize all properties in
the bimodal language that are true in all states of all epistemic tran-
sition systems. In addition to the distributed version of S5 axioms
for modality K, our logical system contains the Cooperation axiom,
introduced by Marc Pauly [13, 14] for strategies in general,
HD1C1 (φ → ψ ) → (H
D2
C2
φ → HD1∪D2C1∪C2 ψ ), (1)
where D1 ∩D2 = . Informally, this axiom states that second-order
know-how strategies of two disjoint coalitions can be combined to
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form a single second-order know-how strategy to achieve a com-
mon goal. The system also has the Strategic Introspection axiom:
HDC φ → KCHDC φ, (2)
which states that if coalition C knows how coalition D can achieve
the goal, then coalitionC knows that it knows how coalition D can
achieve this. A version of this axiom for the first-order know-how
appeared in [1]. In addition, our logical system contains the Empty
coalition axiom which appeared first in [10]:
Kφ → Hφ. (3)
This axiom says that if a statement is known to the empty coalition,
then the empty coalition has a first-order know-how strategy to
achieve it. The axiom is true because the empty coalition can know
only statements that are true in each state of the given epistemic
transition system. The final and perhaps the most interesting axiom
of our logical system is the Knowledge of Unavoidability axiom:
KAH

Bφ → HAφ. (4)
Formula HBφ means that coalition B knows that φ will be achieved
no matter how agents act. Thus, coalition B knows that φ is un-
avoidable. The axiom states that if coalition A knows that coalition
B knows that φ is unavoidable, then coalition A also knows that φ
is unavoidable. To the best of our knowledge, this axiom does not
appear in the existing literature. The main technical results of this
paper are the soundness and the completeness of the logical system
describing the interplay between modalities K and H. The system
extends epistemic logic S5 with distributed knowledge by axioms
(1), (2), (3), and (4).
1.4 Harmony
Proving the completeness theorem for the interplay between knowl-
edge and second-order know-how modalites is significantly more
difficult than proving corresponding completeness theorems for bi-
modal logical systems describing the interplay between knowledge
and first-order know-how modalities [1, 4, 8, 9, 12]. In the proof we
use notions of harmony and complete harmony (see Definition 6.2
and Definition 6.6). The proof technique based on harmony has
been originally developed by Naumov and Tao [10] for the trimodal
logical system that describes the interplay between a distributed
knowledge modality, a (not know-how) strategic modality, and a
first-order know-how modality. We have modified the definitions
of harmony and complete harmony for this technique to work in
the current setting. See Section 6.1 and Section 6.2 for details.
1.5 Paper Outline
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce formal
syntax and semantics of the logical system. In Section 3 we list
its axioms and inference rules. Section 4 provides examples of
formal proofs. The proofs of the soundness and the completeness
are presented in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS
Throughout the paper we fix a countable set of propositional vari-
ables and a countable set of agents A. A coalition is an arbitrary
subset of A. A strategy profile of a coalition C is an arbitrary func-
tion that assigns a value from some domain ∆ to each agent in
coalitionC . We denote the set of all such strategy profiles byC∆. A
complete strategy profile is a strategy profile of the coalition A.
Following the convention in game theory, we consider a strategy
profile as a (possibly infinite) tuple of values from ∆ indexed by set
C . If s ∈ C∆ and a ∈ C , then by (s)a we denote the component of
this tuple corresponding to the index value a, which technically is
the value of function s on the argument a.
Definition 2.1. A tuple (W , {∼a }a∈A ,∆,M,π ) is an (epistemic)
transition system, if
(1) W is a set (of epistemic states),
(2) ∼a is an indistinguishability equivalence relation on setW
for each a ∈ A,
(3) ∆ is a nonempty set, called the domain of actions,
(4) M ⊆W × ∆A ×W is an aggregation mechanism,
(5) π is a function from propositional variables to subsets ofW .
A fragment of a transition system is depicted in Figure 2. In this
example, setW consists of states such asw1,w2, andw3. Relation∼a
is denoted by dashed lines. The domain of actions ∆ is set {−, 0,+}.
For each state, mechanismM specifies the next state based on the
actions of individual agents. The mechanism is captured by the
directed edges between the states, labeled with strategy profiles.
There are two important things to note about the aggregation
mechanism. First, the mechanism might be non-deterministic and
thus we formally define it as a ternary relation between the current
state, the strategy profile, and the next state. Second, the next state
might not exist. If the next state does not exist for the selected
strategy profile, then the transition system terminates.
Definition 2.2. For any states w1,w2 ∈ W and any coalition C ,
letw1 ∼C w2 ifw1 ∼a w2 for each agent a ∈ C .
Lemma 2.3. For each coalition C , relation ∼C is an equivalence
relation on the set of epistemic statesW . □
Definition 2.4. For any strategy profiles s1 and s2 of coalitions
C1 and C2 respectively and any coalition C ⊆ C1 ∩C2, let s1 =C s2
if (s1)a = (s2)a for each a ∈ C .
Lemma 2.5. For any coalition C , relation =C is an equivalence
relation on the set of all strategy profiles of coalitions containing
coalition C . □
Definition 2.6. Let Φ be the minimal set of formulae such that
(1) p ∈ Φ for each propositional variable p,
(2) ¬φ,φ → ψ ∈ Φ for all formulae φ,ψ ∈ Φ,
(3) KCφ,HDC φ ∈ Φ for each coalition C , each finite coalition D,
and each formula φ ∈ Φ.
It is crucial in the proof of completeness that superscript D of
modality HDC is finite. For the sake of generality, we allow subscript
C to be infinite. We assume that the constant⊤ and the conjunction
∧ are defined through connectives ¬ and→ in the standard way.
Furthermore, for any finite set of formulae X , by ∧X we mean the
conjunction of all formulae in set X . In particular, ∧ is formula ⊤.
The next definition is the key definition of this paper. Its part (5)
specifies the semantics of the second-order know-howmodalityHDC .
Informally,w ⊩ HDC φ means that there is a strategy of the coalition
D that can be used to achieve φ from every state indistinguishable
from statew by the coalition C .
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Definition 2.7. For any epistemic state w ∈ W of a transition
system (W , {∼a }a∈A ,V ,M,π ) and any formula φ ∈ Φ, let relation
w ⊩ φ be defined as follows:
(1) w ⊩ p ifw ∈ π (p), where p is a propositional variable,
(2) w ⊩ ¬φ ifw ⊮ φ,
(3) w ⊩ φ → ψ ifw ⊮ φ orw ⊩ ψ ,
(4) w ⊩ KCφ ifw ′ ⊩ φ for eachw ′ ∈W such thatw ∼C w ′,
(5) w ⊩ HDC φ if there is a strategy profile s ∈ VD such that for
any two statesw ′,u ∈W and any complete strategy profile
s′, ifw ∼C w ′, s =D s′, and (w ′, s′,u) ∈ M , then u ⊩ φ.
3 AXIOMS
In additional to the propositional tautologies in language Φ, our
logical system consists of the following axioms:
(1) Truth: KCφ → φ,
(2) Negative Introspection: ¬KCφ → KC¬KCφ,
(3) Distributivity: KC (φ → ψ ) → (KCφ → KCψ ),
(4) Monotonicity: KCφ → KDφ, if C ⊆ D,
(5) Cooperation: HD1C1 (φ → ψ ) → (H
D2
C2
φ → HD1∪D2C1∪C2 ψ ), where
D1 ∩ D2 = .
(6) Strategic Introspection: HDC φ → KCHDC φ,
(7) Empty Coalition: Kφ → Hφ.
(8) Knowledge of Unavoidability: KAHBφ → HAφ.
We write ⊢ φ if formula φ is provable from the axioms of our logical
system using Necessitation, Strategic Necessitation, and Modus
Ponens inference rules:
φ
KCφ
φ
HDC φ
φ, φ → ψ
ψ
.
We write X ⊢ φ if formula φ is provable from the theorems of the
logical system and a set of additional axioms X using only Modus
Ponens inference rule.
4 EXAMPLES OF DERIVATIONS
We show the soundness of the above logical system in Section 5.
Below, we provide some examples of formal proofs in this system.
These results are used later in the proof of the completeness.
Lemma 4.1. ⊢ HD1C1 φ → H
D2
C2
φ where C1 ⊆ C2 and D1 ⊆ D2.
Proof. Statement φ → φ is a tautology. Thus, by the Strate-
gic Necessitation inference rule, ⊢ HD2\D1C2\C1 (φ → φ). Next, by the
Cooperation axiom and due to C1 ⊆ C2 and D1 ⊆ D2,
⊢ HD2\D1C2\C1 (φ → φ) → (H
D1
C1
φ → HD2C2 φ).
Hence, ⊢ HD1C1 φ → H
D2
C2
φ by the Modus Ponens inference rule. □
Lemma 4.2. If φ1, . . . ,φn ⊢ ψ , then
(1) KCφ1, . . . ,KCφn ⊢ KCψ ,
(2) HD1C1 φ1, . . . ,H
Dn
Cn
φn ⊢ H
⋃n
i=1 Di⋃n
i=1Ci
ψ , where sets D1,. . . ,Dn are
pairwise disjoint.
Proof. To prove statement (2), apply the deduction lemma for
propositional logic n time. Then, ⊢ φ1 → (· · · → (φn → ψ )). Thus,
⊢ H(φ1 → (· · · → (φn → ψ ))), by the Strategic Necessitation
inference rule. Hence, ⊢ HD1C1 φ1 → H
D1
C1
(φ2 · · · → (φn → ψ )) by
the Cooperation axiom and the Modus Ponens inference rule. Then,
HD1C1 φ1 ⊢ H
D1
C1
(φ2 · · · → (φn → ψ )) by the Modus Ponens inference
rule. Thus, again by the Cooperation axiom and Modus Ponens,
HD1C1 φ1 ⊢ H
D2
C2
φ2 → HD1∪D2C1∪C2 (φ3 · · · → (φn → ψ )). Therefore,
HD1C1 φ1, . . . ,H
Dn
Cn
φn ⊢ H
⋃n
i=1 Di⋃n
i=1Ci
ψ , by repeating the last two steps
n − 2 times. The proof of the first statement is similar, but it uses
the Distributivity axiom instead of the Cooperation axiom. □
5 SOUNDNESS
The proof of the soundness of S5 axioms for distributed knowledge
(Truth, Negative Introspection, Distributivity, and Monotonicity)
is standard. In this section we prove the soundness of each of the
remaining axioms as a separate lemma. At the end of this section,
Theorem 5.5 states the soundness of the whole system.
Lemma 5.1. If w ⊩ HD1C1 (φ → ψ ), w ⊩ H
D2
C2
φ, and D1 ∩ D2 = ,
thenw ⊩ HD1∪D2C1∪C2 ψ .
Proof. Suppose thatw ⊩ HD1C1 (φ → ψ ). Then, by Definition 2.7,
there is a strategy profile s1 ∈ ∆D1 such that for any two epistemic
states w ′,w ′′ and any complete strategy profile s′1, if w ∼C1 w ′,
s1 =D1 s
′
1, and (w ′, s′1,w ′′) ∈ M , then w ′′ ⊩ φ → ψ . Similarly,
assumptionw ⊩ HD2C2 φ implies that there is a strategy profile s2 ∈
∆D2 such that for any two epistemic statesw ′,w ′′ and any complete
strategy profile s′2, if w ∼C2 w ′, s2 =D2 s′2, and (w ′, s′2,w ′′) ∈ M ,
thenw ′′ ⊩ φ.
Define a strategy profile s of coalition D1 ∪ D2 as follows:
(s)a =
{
(s1)a , if a ∈ D1,
(s2)a , if a ∈ D2.
The strategy profile s is well-defined because D1 ∩ D2 = .
Consider any states w ′,w ′′ ∈ W and any complete strategy
profile s′ such thatw ∼C1∪C2 w ′, s =D1∪D2 s′ and (w ′, s′,w ′′) ∈ M .
By Definition 2.7, it suffices to show that w ′′ ⊩ ψ . Indeed, by
Definition 2.2, assumption w ∼C1∪C2 w ′ implies that w ∼C1 w ′
and w ∼C2 w ′. At the same time, by Definition 2.4, s =D1∪D2 s′
implies that s =D1 s′ and s =D2 s′. Thus, w ′′ ⊩ φ → ψ and
w ′′ ⊩ φ by the choice of strategies s1 and s2. Therefore,w ′′ ⊩ ψ by
Definition 2.7. □
Lemma 5.2. Ifw ⊩ HDC φ, thenw ⊩ KCH
D
C φ.
Proof. Suppose that w ⊩ HDC φ. Then, by Definition 2.7, there
is a strategy profile s ∈ ∆D such that for any two epistemic states
w ′,w ′′ and any complete strategy profile s′, if w ∼C w ′, s =D s′,
and (w ′, s′,w ′′) ∈ M , thenw ′′ ⊩ φ.
Consider any u ∈ W such that w ∼C u. By Definition 2.7, it
suffices to show that u ⊩ HDC φ. Next, consider any epistemic states
u ′,u ′′ and any complete strategy profile s′ such that u ∼C u ′,
s =D s′, and (u ′, s′,u ′′) ∈ M . Again by Definition 2.7, it suffices to
show that u ′′ ⊩ φ. Indeed, note that w ∼C u and u ∼C u ′ imply
that w ∼C u ′ by Lemma 2.3. Hence, u ′′ ⊩ φ by the choice of the
strategy profile s. □
Lemma 5.3. Ifw ⊩ Kφ, thenw ⊩ Hφ.
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Proof. Suppose w ⊩ Kφ. Let s be the unique element of the
set ∆. Since ∆ is the set of all functions from  to ∆, assuming
functions are defined as sets of pairs, formally s is the empty set.
Consider any two epistemic states w ′,w ′′ and any complete
strategy profile s′ such thatw ∼ w ′, s = s′, and (w ′, s′,w ′′) ∈ M .
By Definition 2.7, it suffices to show that w ′′ ⊩ φ. Indeed, note
thatw ∼ w ′′ by Definition 2.2. It then follows from assumption
w ⊩ Kφ and Definition 2.7 thatw ′′ ⊩ φ. □
Lemma 5.4. Ifw ⊩ KAHBφ, thenw ⊩ H

Aφ.
Proof. Let s be the unique element of the set ∆. Consider any
two epistemic states w ′,w ′′ and any complete strategy profile s′
such thatw ∼A w ′, s = s′, and (w ′, s′,w ′′) ∈ M . By Definition 2.7,
it suffices to show thatw ′′ ⊩ φ.
Assumptionw ⊩ KAHBφ implies thatw
′ ⊩ HBφ due tow ∼A w ′
and Definition 2.7. Thus, there is a strategy profile sˆ such that for
any two epistemic states u ′,u ′′ and any complete strategy profile
sˆ′, ifw ′ ∼B u ′, sˆ = sˆ′, and (u ′, sˆ′,u ′′) ∈ M , then u ′′ ⊩ φ.
Let u ′ = w ′, u ′′ = w ′′, and sˆ′ = s′. Note thatw ′ ∼B w ′ = u ′ by
Definition 2.2 and that sˆ = s′ by Definition 2.4. Thus,w ′′ ⊩ φ. □
Theorem 5.5. If ⊢ φ, then w ⊩ φ for each epistemic state w of
each epistemic transition system. □
6 COMPLETENESS
This section contains a proof of the completeness of the logical
system. We start with a well-known observation that Positive In-
trospection principle is provable in S5.
Lemma 6.1. ⊢ KCφ → KCKCφ.
Proof. Formula ¬KCφ → KC¬KCφ is an instance of the Neg-
ative Introspection axiom. Thus, ⊢ ¬KC¬KCφ → KCφ by the law
of contrapositive in the propositional logic. Hence, by the Neces-
sitation inference rule, ⊢ KC (¬KC¬KCφ → KCφ). Thus, by the
Distributivity axiom and the Modus Ponens inference rule,
⊢ KC¬KC¬KCφ → KCKCφ. (5)
At the same time, KC¬KCφ → ¬KCφ is an instance of the Truth
axiom. Thus, ⊢ KCφ → ¬KC¬KCφ by contraposition. Hence, tak-
ing into account the following instance of the Negative Introspec-
tion axiom: ¬KC¬KCφ → KC¬KC¬KCφ, one can conclude that
⊢ KCφ → KC¬KC¬KCφ. The latter, together with statement (5),
implies the statement of the lemma by propositional reasoning. □
6.1 Harmony
The proof of the completeness is based on the harmony technique
proposed by Naumov and Tao [10, 11]. Here, we modify definitions
of harmony and complete harmony from [10, 11] to account for the
fact that parametersC and D of the modality HDC might be different.
Definition 6.2. A pair (Y ,Z ) is in harmony if Y ⊬ HC¬ ∧ Z ′ for
each coalition C and each finite set Z ′ ⊆ Z .
Lemma 6.3. If pair (Y ,Z ) is in harmony, then sets Y and Z are
consistent.
Proof. First, suppose that set Y is not consistent. Thus, Y ⊢
H¬∧. Therefore, by Definition 6.2, pair (Y ,Z ) is not in harmony.
Next, suppose that set Z is inconsistent. Then, there is a finite
set Z ′ ⊆ Z such that ⊢ ¬ ∧ Z ′. Hence, ⊢ H¬ ∧ Z ′ by the Strategic
Necessitation inference rule. Thus, Y ⊢ H¬ ∧ Z ′. Therefore, by
Definition 6.2, pair (Y ,Z ) is not in harmony. □
Lemma 6.4. If X ⊬ HDC φ and f is an arbitrary function from
coalition D to set Φ, then pair (Y ,Z ) is in harmony, where
Y = {ψ | KCψ ∈ X },
Z = {¬φ} ∪ {χ | Kχ ∈ X } ∪
{τ | HFEτ ∈ X , F ⊆ D,E ⊆ C,∀a ∈ F (f (a) = τ )}.
Proof. Let pair (Y ,Z ) not be in harmony. Then, Y ⊢ HB¬ ∧ Z ′
for some set B ⊆ A and some finite set Z ′ ⊆ Z by Definition 6.2.
Thus, by the definition of set Y , there are formulae
KCψ1, . . . ,KCψn ∈ X (6)
such thatψ1, . . . ,ψn ⊢ HB¬ ∧ Z ′. By Lemma 4.2,
KCψ1, . . . ,KCψn ⊢ KCHB¬ ∧ Z ′.
Then, by the Knowledge of Unavoidability axiom
KCψ1, . . . ,KCψn ⊢ HC¬ ∧ Z ′. (7)
Since Z ′ ⊆ Z , by the definition of set Z , there are
formulae Kχ1, . . . ,Kχm ∈ X , (8)
and formulae HF1E1τ1, . . . ,H
Ft
Et
τt ∈ X , (9)
such that F1, . . . , Ft ⊆ D,E1, . . . ,Et ⊆ C, (10)
∀i ≤ t ∀a ∈ Fi (f (a) = τi ), (11)
and χ1, . . . , χm ,τ1, . . . ,τt ,¬φ ⊢ ∧Z ′.
By the deduction theorem for propositional logic, the last statement
implies that χ1, . . . , χm ,τ1, . . . ,τt ⊢ ¬φ → ∧Z ′. Hence, by the law
of contrapositive, χ1, . . . , χm ,τ1, . . . ,τt ⊢ ¬∧Z ′ → φ. Then by the
Modus Ponens inference rule,
¬ ∧ Z ′, χ1, . . . , χm ,τ1, . . . ,τt ⊢ φ. (12)
Without loss of generality, we assume that formulae τ1, . . . ,τt are
pairwise different. Hence, sets F1, . . . , Ft are pairwise disjoint, by
statement (11). Thus, by Lemma 4.2, statement (12) implies that
HC¬ ∧ Z ′,Hχ1, . . . ,Hχm ,HF1E1τ1, . . . ,H
Ft
Et
τt
⊢ HF1∪···∪FtC∪E1∪···∪Etφ.
Hence, by Lemma 4.1 and due to statement (10),
HC¬ ∧ Z ′,Hχ1, . . . ,Hχm ,HF1E1τ1, . . . ,H
Ft
Et
τt ⊢ HDC φ.
Then, by the Empty Coalition axiom,
HC¬ ∧ Z ′,Kχ1, . . . ,Kχm ,HF1E1τ1, . . . ,H
Ft
Et
τt ⊢ HDC φ.
Therefore, by statement (7),
KCψ1, . . . ,KCψn ,Kχ1, . . . ,Kχm ,HF1E1τ1, . . . ,H
Ft
Et
τt ⊢HDC φ.
It then follows from statements (6), (8), and (9) that X ⊢ HDC φ. □
Lemma 6.5. For any pair (Y ,Z ) in harmony, any formula φ ∈ Φ,
and any setC ⊆ A, either pair (Y ∪ {¬HCφ},Z ) or pair (Y ,Z ∪ {φ})
is in harmony.
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Proof. Suppose that neither pair (Y ∪ {¬HCφ},Z ) nor pair(Y ,Z ∪ {φ}) is in harmony. Then, by Definition 6.2, there are sets
E1,E2 ⊆ A and finite sets Z1 ⊆ Z and Z2 ⊆ Z ∪ {φ} such that
Y ,¬HCφ ⊢ HE1¬ ∧ Z1 and Y ⊢ HE2¬ ∧ Z2. Let D = C ∪ E1 ∪ E2.
Then, by Lemma 4.1 applied three times, we have
Y ,¬HDφ ⊢ HD¬ ∧ Z1 (13)
and
Y ⊢ HD¬ ∧ Z2. (14)
Let Z0 = Z1 ∪ (Z2 \ {φ}). Then, formulae ∧Z0 → ∧Z1 and φ ∧
(∧Z0) → ∧Z2 are propositional tautologies because Z1 ⊆ Z0 and
Z2 ⊆ Z0∪{φ}. Thus, by the law of contrapositive, ⊢ ¬∧Z1 → ¬∧Z0
and ⊢ ¬ ∧ Z2 → ¬(φ ∧ (∧Z0)). Hence, ⊢ ¬ ∧ Z1 → ¬ ∧ Z0 and
⊢ ¬ ∧ Z2 → (φ → ¬ ∧ Z0). Therefore, ¬ ∧ Z1 ⊢ ¬ ∧ Z0 and
¬ ∧ Z2 ⊢ φ → ¬ ∧ Z0 by the Modus Ponens inference rule. Thus,
by Lemma 4.2,
HD¬ ∧ Z1 ⊢ HD¬ ∧ Z0,
HD¬ ∧ Z2 ⊢ HD (φ → ¬∧ Z0).
Then, due to statements (13) and (14),
Y ,¬HDφ ⊢ HD¬ ∧ Z0, (15)
Y ⊢ HD (φ → ¬∧ Z0). (16)
By the Cooperation axiom and the Modus Ponens inference rule,
formula (16) implies thatY ,HDφ ⊢ HD¬∧Z0.Hence,Y ⊢ HD¬∧Z0
by the laws of propositional reasoning from statement (15). The
last statement, by Definition 6.2, contradicts the assumption that
pair (Y ,Z ) is in harmony because Z0 ⊆ Z . □
6.2 Complete Harmony
Definition 6.6. A pair in harmony (Y ,Z ) is in complete harmony
if for each φ ∈ Φ and each coalition C , either ¬HCφ ∈ Y or φ ∈ Z .
Lemma 6.7. If pair (Y ,Z ) is in harmony, then there is a pair in
complete harmony (Y ′,Z ′), where Y ⊆ Y ′ and Z ⊆ Z ′.
Proof. Recall that the set of agent A and the set of proposi-
tional variables are countable. Thus, the set of all formulae Φ is
also countable. Let sequence HC1φ1,H

C2
φ2, . . . be an enumeration
of the set {HCφ | φ ∈ Φ,C ⊆ A}. We define two chains of sets
Y1 ⊆ Y2 ⊆ . . . and Z1 ⊆ Z2 ⊆ . . . such that pair (Yn ,Zn ) is in
harmony for each n ≥ 1. These two chains are defined recursively
as follows:
(1) Y1 = Y and Z1 = Z ,
(2) if pair (Yn ,Zn ) is in harmony, then, by Lemma 6.5, either pair
(Yn ∪ {¬HCnφn },Zn ) or pair (Yn ,Zn ∪ {φn }) is in harmony.
Let (Yn+1,Zn+1) be (Yn ∪ {¬HCnφn },Zn ) in the former case
and (Yn ,Zn ∪ {φn }) in the latter case.
Let Y ′ = ⋃n Yn and Z ′ = ⋃n Zn . Note that Y = Y1 ⊆ Y ′ and
Z = Z1 ⊆ Z ′.
We next show that pair (Y ′,Z ′) is in harmony. Suppose the
opposite. Then, by Definition 6.2, there is a coalition C and a finite
set Z ′′ ⊆ Z ′ such that Y ′ ⊢ HC¬∧Z ′′. Since a deduction uses only
finitely many assumptions, there exists an integer n1 ≥ 1 such that
Yn1 ⊢ HC¬ ∧ Z ′′. (17)
At the same time, since set Z ′′ is finite, there must exist an integer
n2 ≥ 1 such thatZ ′′ ⊆ Zn2 . Letn = max{n1,n2}. Note that¬∧Z ′′ ⊢
¬ ∧ Zn because Z ′′ ⊆ Zn2 ⊆ Zn . Thus, HC¬ ∧ Z ′′ ⊢ HC¬ ∧ Zn by
Lemma 4.2. Hence, Yn1 ⊢ HC¬ ∧ Zn due to statement (17). Thus,
Yn ⊢ HC¬ ∧ Zn because Yn1 ⊆ Yn . Then, pair (Yn ,Zn ) is not in
harmony, which contradicts the choice of pair (Yn ,Zn ). Therefore,
pair (Y ′,Z ′) is in harmony.
We finally show that pair (Y ′,Z ′) is in complete harmony. Indeed,
consider any formula HCφ ∈ Φ. Since sequence HC1φ1,HC2φ2, . . .
is an enumeration of all formulae in the set {HCφ | φ ∈ Φ,C ⊆ A},
there must exist an integer k ≥ 1 such that HCφ = HCkφk . Then,
by the choice of pair (Yk+1,Zk+1), either ¬HCφ = ¬HCkφk ∈
Yk+1 ⊆ Y ′ or φ = φk ∈ Zk+1 ⊆ Z ′. Therefore, the pair (Y ′,Z ′) is
in complete harmony. □
6.3 Canonical Epistemic Transition System
In this section, we use the “unravelling” technique [15] to define a
canonical transition system ETS(X0) = (W , {∼a }a∈A ,∆,M,π ) for
an arbitrary maximal consistent set of formulae X0 ⊆ Φ.
Definition 6.8. The set of epistemic statesW consists of all finite
sequences X0,C1,X1,C2, . . . ,Cn ,Xn , such that
(1) n ≥ 0,
(2) Xi is a maximal consistent subset of Φ for each i ≥ 1,
(3) Ci is a coalition for each i ≥ 1,
(4) {φ | KCiφ ∈ Xi−1} ⊆ Xi for each i ≥ 1.
SetW can be viewed as a tree whose nodes are labeled with
maximal consistent sets andwhose edges are labeled with coalitions.
For any sequence x = x1, . . . ,xn and an element y, by sequence
x :: y we mean x1, . . . ,xn ,y. If sequence x is nonempty, then by
hd(x) we mean element xn . The abbreviation hd stands for “head”.
Definition 6.9. For any state w = X0,C1, . . . ,Cn ,Xn and any
statew ′ = X0,C ′1, . . . ,C
′
m ,X
′
m , letw ∼a w ′ if there is k such that
(1) 0 ≤ k ≤ min{n,m},
(2) Xi = X ′i for each i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ k ,
(3) Ci = C ′i for each i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ k ,
(4) a ∈ Ci for each i such that k < i ≤ n,
(5) a ∈ C ′i for each i such that k < i ≤ m.
Definition 6.10. ∆ = {(φ,C, [w]C ) | φ ∈ Φ,C ⊆ A,w ∈W }.
Informally, each action (φ,C, [w]C ) ∈ ∆ of an agent c ∈ C con-
sists of a formula φ that coalition C is trying to achieve and an
indistinguishability class [w]C . Class [w]C acts as a “signature”
with which coalition C “signs” its action. As per definition of the
mechanism M below, an action might have an effect only if it is
signed with the right signature.
Definition 6.11. For any states w,w ′ ∈ W and any complete
strategy profile s ∈ ΦA , let (w, s,w ′) ∈ M if set hd(w ′) contains all
elements of the set
{φ | (HDC φ ∈ hd(w)) ∧ ∀a ∈ D((s)a = (φ,C, [w]C ))}.
Definition 6.12. π (p) = {w ∈W | p ∈ hd(w)}.
This concludes the definition of the canonical epistemic transi-
tion system ETS(X0).
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6.4 Properties of the Canonical System
Lemma 6.13. For any state X0,C1,X1, . . . ,Cn ,Xn ∈W and any
integer k ≤ n, if KCφ ∈ Xn and C ⊆ Ci for each integer i such that
k < i ≤ n, then KCφ ∈ Xk .
Proof. Suppose that there is k ≤ n such that KCφ < Xk . Let
m be the maximal such k . Note thatm < n due to the assumption
KCφ ∈ Xn of the lemma. Thus,m + 1 ≤ n.
Assumption KCφ < Xm implies ¬KCφ ∈ Xm due to the max-
imality of the set Xm . Hence, Xm ⊢ KC¬KCφ by the Negative
Introspection axiom. Thus, Xm ⊢ KCm+1¬KCφ by the Monotonicity
axiom and the assumption C ⊆ Cm+1 of the lemma (recall that
m + 1 ≤ n). Then, KCm+1¬KCφ ∈ Xm due to the maximality of the
setXm . Hence,¬KCφ ∈ Xm+1 by Definition 6.8. Thus, KCφ < Xm+1
due to the consistency of the set Xm+1, which is a contradiction
with the choice of integerm. □
Lemma 6.14. For any state X0,C1,X1, . . . ,Cn ,Xn ∈W and any
integer k ≤ n, if KCφ ∈ Xk and C ⊆ Ci for each integer i such that
k < i ≤ n, then φ ∈ Xn .
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the distance be-
tween n and k . In the base case n = k , the assumption KCφ ∈ Xn
implies Xn ⊢ φ by the Truth axiom. Therefore, φ ∈ Xn due to the
maximality of set Xn .
Suppose thatk < n. AssumptionKCφ ∈ Xk impliesXk ⊢ KCKCφ
by Lemma 6.1. Thus, Xk ⊢ KCk+1KCφ by the Monotonicity axiom,
the condition k < n of the inductive step, and the assumption
C ⊆ Ck+1 of the lemma. Then, KCk+1KCφ ∈ Xk by the maximality
of set Xk . Hence, KCφ ∈ Xk+1 by Definition 6.8. Therefore, φ ∈ Xn
by the induction hypothesis. □
The next lemma follows from Lemma 6.13, Lemma 6.14, and
Definition 6.9 because there is a unique path between any two
nodes in a tree.
Lemma 6.15. For any epistemic statesw,w ′ ∈W such thatw ∼C
w ′, if KCφ ∈ hd(w), then φ ∈ hd(w ′). □
For any triplev = (x ,y, z), by pr1(v), pr2(v), and pr3(v)we mean
x , y, and z, respectively.
Lemma 6.16. If w1,w2 ∈ pr3(v), then w1 ∼pr2(v) w2, for each
w1,w2 ∈W and each v ∈ ∆.
Proof. Let v = (φ,C, [w]C ), where φ ∈ Φ, C ⊆ A, and w ∈W .
Assumption w1,w2 ∈ pr3(v) implies that w1,w2 ∈ [w]C . Thus,
w1 ∼C w ∼C w2. Hence,w1 ∼C w2. Therefore,w1 ∼pr2(v) w2. □
Lemma 6.17. For any statew ∈W if ¬KCφ ∈ hd(w), then there is
a statew ′ ∈W such thatw ∼C w ′ and ¬φ ∈ hd(w ′).
Proof. Consider the set of formulae
X = {¬φ} ∪ {ψ | KCψ ∈ hd(w)}.
First, we show that set X is consistent. Assume the opposite. Then,
there are KCψ1, . . . ,KCψn ∈ hd(w) such thatψ1, . . . ,ψn ⊢ φ. Thus,
KCψ1, . . . ,KCψn ⊢ KCφ by Lemma 4.2. Therefore, hd(w) ⊢ KCφ
by the choice of formulae KCψ1, . . . ,KCψn , which contradicts the
consistency of set hd(w) due to the assumption ¬KCφ ∈ hd(w).
Let Xˆ be a maximal consistent extension of set X and letw ′ be
sequence w :: C :: X . Note that w ′ ∈W by Definition 6.8 and the
choice of set X . Furthermore,w ∼C w ′ by Definition 6.9. To finish
the proof, note that ¬φ ∈ X ⊆ Xˆ = hd(w ′) by the choice of X . □
Lemma 6.18. Letw,w ′,u ∈W be epistemic states, HDC φ ∈ hd(w)
be a formula, and s be a complete strategy profile such that (s)a =
(φ,C, [w]C ) for each a ∈ D. If w ∼C w ′ and (w ′, s,u) ∈ M , then
φ ∈ hd(u).
Proof. Let HDC φ ∈ hd(w). Then, hd(w) ⊢ KCHDC φ by the Strate-
gic Introspection axiom. Thus, KCHDC φ ∈ hd(w) by the maximality
of the set hd(w). Hence, HDC φ ∈ hd(w ′) by Lemma 6.15 and the
assumptionw ∼C w ′. Then, φ ∈ hd(u) by Definition 6.11 because
of assumption (w ′, s,u) ∈ M and assumption (s)a = (φ,C, [w]C )
for each a ∈ D. □
Lemma 6.19. For any statew ∈W , any formula ¬HDC φ ∈ hd(w),
and any strategy profile s ∈ ∆D , there are epistemic statesw ′,u ∈W
and a complete strategy profile s′ such that w ∼C w ′, s =D s′,
(w ′, s′,u) ∈ M , and φ < hd(u).
Proof. Set D0 = {a ∈ D | pr2((s)a ) ⊈ C} is finite because set D
is finite by Definition 2.6. Let D0 = {a1, . . . ,an }.
Next, consider sets
Y = {ψ | KCψ ∈ hd(w)}
Z = {¬φ} ∪ {χ | Kχ ∈ hd(w)} ∪
{τ | HFEτ ∈ hd(w), F ⊆ D,E ⊆ C,∀a ∈ F (pr1((s)a ) = τ )}.
By Lemma 6.4, pair (Y ,Z ) is in harmony. Thus, by Lemma 6.7, there
is a pair (Y ′,Z ′) in complete harmony such thatY ⊆ Y ′ andZ ⊆ Z ′.
By Lemma 6.3, sets Y ′ and Z ′ are consistent. Let Y ′′ and Z ′′ be any
maximal consistent extensions of sets Y ′ and Z ′ respectively.
Recall that n is the number of elements in set D0. Define se-
quencesw1, . . . ,wn+1 as follows:
w1 = w :: C :: Y ′′
w2 = w :: C :: Y ′′ :: C :: Y ′′
w3 = w :: C :: Y ′′ :: C :: Y ′′ :: C :: Y ′′
. . . . . .
wn+1 = w :: C :: Y ′′ :: C :: Y ′′ · · · :: C :: Y ′′︸                                    ︷︷                                    ︸
::C ::Y ′′ repeated n + 1 times
.
Claim 1. wk ∈W where 1 ≤ k ≤ n + 1.
Proof of Claim.We prove the claim by induction on integer k . If
k = 1, then, by Definition 6.8, it suffices to show that {φ | KCφ ∈
hd(w)} ⊆ Y ′′. Indeed, by the choice ofY ,Y ′,Y ′′, we have {φ | KCφ ∈
hd(w)} = Y ⊆ Y ′ ⊆ Y ′′.
For the induction step, by Definition 6.8 and the definition of
w1, . . . ,wn+1, it suffices to show that {φ | KCφ ∈ Y ′′} ⊆ Y ′′. This
follows from the Truth axiom and the maximality of set Y ′′. □
Claim 2. w ∼C wi for each i ≤ n + 1.
Proof of Claim. The claims follows from Definition 2.2, Defini-
tion 6.9, and the definition ofw1, . . . ,wn+1. □
Claim 3. Ifwi ∼E w j and i , j, then E ⊆ C .
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Proof of Claim. Consider any agent a ∈ E. Assumptionwi ∼E w j
implies that wi ∼a w j by Definition 2.2. Thus, a ∈ C by Defini-
tion 6.9, the definition ofwi andw j , and the assumption i , j. □
Claim 4. There is an integer k ≤ n + 1 such that for each i ≤ n,
we havewk < pr3((s)ai ).
Proof of Claim. Suppose that for each k ≤ n+1 there is i ≤ n such
that wk ∈ pr3((s)ai ). Then, by the pigeonhole principle, there is
j ≤ n and k1,k2 ≤ n+1 such that k1 , k2 andwk1 ,wk2 ∈ pr3((s)aj ).
Hence, wk1 ∼pr2((s)aj ) wk2 by Lemma 6.16. Hence, pr2((s)aj ) ⊆ C
by Claim 3, which contradicts the choice of set D0. □
We now continue with the proof of the lemma. Choose w ′ ∈
{w1, . . . ,wn+1} such that
∀a ∈ D0 (w ′ < pr3((s)a )). (18)
Suchwk exists by Claim 4 and the choice of agents a1, . . . ,an . Let
u be sequencew ::  :: Z ′′. Note that u ∈W by Definition 6.8.
Let s′ be the complete strategy profile such that
(s′)a =
{
(s)a , a ∈ D,
(⊤,C, [w]C ), otherwise.
(19)
Note that s =D s′ by Definition 2.4.
Claim 5. (w ′, s′,u) ∈ M .
Proof of Claim. Consider any formula HFEτ ∈ hd(w ′) such that
(s′)a = (τ ,E, [w ′]E ), for each a ∈ F . (20)
By Definition 6.11, it suffices to show that τ ∈ hd(u). We consider
the following four cases separately.
Case 1: F = . Thus, either ¬HFEτ ∈ Y ′ ⊆ Y ′′ = hd(w ′) or τ ∈ Z ′ ⊆
Z ′′ = hd(u) by Definition 6.6, because pair (Y ′,Z ′) is in complete
harmony. Hence, τ ∈ hd(u) because set hd(w ′) is consistent and
HFEτ ∈ hd(w ′).
Case 2: F ⊈ D. Then, there is an agent f0 ∈ F such that f0 < D.
Hence, (s′)f0 = (τ ,E, [w ′]E ) by equation (20). At the same time,
(s′)f0 = (⊤,C, [w]C ) by equation (19). Thus, τ = ⊤. Therefore,
τ ∈ hd(u) because hd(u) is a maximal consistent set.
Case 3: F ,  and F ⊆ D0. Consider any f0 ∈ F . Note that w ′ <
pr3((s)f0 ) by equation (18) because f0 ∈ F ⊆ D0. Therefore, w ′ <
[w ′]E by equation (20), which contradicts Lemma 2.3.
Case 4: F ⊆ D and F ⊈ D0. Then, there is an agent f0 ∈ F such that
f0 ∈ D \D0. Hence, pr2((s)f0 ) ⊆ C by the definition of set D0. Thus,
E ⊆ C due to equation (20).
Recall that HFEτ ∈ hd(w ′) by the choice of formula HFEτ . Hence,
hd(w ′) ⊢ KEHFEτ by the Strategic Introspection axiom. Hence,
hd(w ′) ⊢ KCHFEτ by the Monotonicity axiom because E ⊆ C .
Thus, KCHFEτ ∈ hd(w ′) because set hd(w ′) is a maximal consis-
tent set. Then, HFEτ ∈ hd(w) by Lemma 6.15 and Claim 2. Therefore,
τ ∈ Z ⊆ Z ′ ⊆ Z ′′ = hd(u) by the choice of set Z , equation (20),
and because F ⊆ D and E ⊆ C . □
To finish the proof of the lemma, notice that ¬φ ∈ Z ⊆ Z ′ ⊆
Z ′′ = hd(u) by the choice of set Z . Therefore, φ < hd(u) because
set hd(u) is consistent. □
Lemma 6.20. w ⊩ φ iff φ ∈ hd(w) for each epistemic statew ∈W
and each formula φ ∈ Φ.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the structural com-
plexity of formula φ. If formula φ is a propositional variable, then
the required follows from Definition 2.7 and Definition 6.12. The
cases of formula φ being a negation or an implication follow from
Definition 2.7, and the maximality and the consistency of the set
hd(w) in the standard way.
Let formula φ have the form KCψ .
(⇒) Suppose that KCψ < hd(w). Then, ¬KCψ ∈ hd(w) by the
maximality of set hd(w). Thus, by Lemma 6.17, there is w ′ ∈ W
such thatw ∼C w ′ and ¬ψ ∈ hd(w ′). By the consistency of hd(w ′),
we have ψ < hd(w ′). Hence, w ′ ⊮ ψ by the induction hypothesis.
Therefore,w ⊮ KCψ by Definition 2.7.
(⇐) Assume that KCψ ∈ hd(w). Consider any w ′ ∈ W such that
w ∼C w ′. By Definition 2.7, it suffices to show thatw ′ ⊩ ψ . Indeed,
ψ ∈ hd(w ′) by Lemma 6.15. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis,
w ′ ⊩ ψ .
Let formula φ have the form HDCψ .
(⇒) Suppose that HDCψ < hd(w). Then, ¬HDCψ ∈ hd(w) due to
the maximality of the set hd(w). Hence, by Lemma 6.19, for any
strategy profile s ∈ ∆D , there are epistemic states w ′,w ′′ ∈ W
and a complete strategy profile s′ such that w ∼C w ′, s =D s′,
(w ′, s′,w ′′) ∈ M , andψ < hd(w ′′). Thus,w ′′ ⊮ ψ by the induction
hypothesis. Therefore,w ⊮ HDCψ by Definition 2.7.
(⇐) Assume that HDCψ ∈ hd(w). Let s be a strategy profile of
coalition D such that (s)a = (ψ ,C, [w]C ) for each agent a ∈ D.
Consider any epistemic statesw ′,w ′′ ∈W and a complete strategy
profile s′ such that w ∼C w ′, s′ =D s, and (w ′, s,w ′′) ∈ M . By
Definition 2.7, it suffices to show thatw ′′ ⊩ ψ .
Indeed, (s′)a = (s)a = (ψ ,C, [w]C ) for each agent a ∈ D by the
choice of s and because s′ =D s. Thus, φ ∈ hd(w ′′) by Lemma 6.18
and due to the assumptionsw ∼C w ′ and (w ′, s,w ′′) ∈ M . There-
fore,w ′′ ⊩ ψ by the induction hypothesis. □
6.5 Completeness: the Final Step
Theorem 6.21. If w ⊩ φ for each epistemic state w of each epis-
temic transition system, then ⊢ φ.
Proof. Suppose that ⊬ φ. Then let X0 be a maximal consistent
set such that ¬φ ∈ X0. Consider the canonical transition system
ETS(X0) defined in Section 6.3. Let w be the single-element se-
quence X0. Then, w ∈ W by Definition 6.8. Thus, w ⊩ ¬φ by
Lemma 6.20. Therefore,w ⊮ φ by Definition 2.7. □
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, building on the existing body of literature on know-
how strategies, we introduced a notion of a second-order know-how
strategy and presented a sound and complete axiomatization of
the interplay between the distributed knowledge modality and
the second-order know-how modality. The logical system includes
a new principle, the Knowledge of Unavoidability, that was not
present in any of the existing axiomatizations of different forms
of the first-order know-how modality. The completeness proof is
based on a harmony technique [10] which was not necessary to
prove the completeness of bimodal logics of first-order know-how.
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